From 9c4a8514d621b6e2a19f56fa9b3396c940b968c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Famulari Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 16:15:34 -0400 Subject: gnu: openssl: Fix CVE-2016-2177 and CVE-2016-2178. * gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl/fixed): Use them. --- gnu/local.mk | 2 + gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++++ gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch | 112 +++++++++ gnu/packages/tls.scm | 4 +- 4 files changed, 403 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch (limited to 'gnu') diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 8036c0ea4b..83f4218a6e 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/openssh-CVE-2015-8325.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \ + %D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch \ + %D%/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/ots-no-include-missing-file.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/patchelf-page-size.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f6465aeaa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-2177. + + + +Source: + + +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic + +A common idiom in the codebase is: + +if (p + len > limit) +{ + return; /* Too long */ +} + +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and +limit == p + SIZE + +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS +message). + +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually +undefined behaviour. + +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! + +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. + +CVE-2016-2177 + +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz +--- + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + /* get the session-id */ + j = *(p++); + +- if (p + j > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* cookie stuff */ +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + cookie_len = *(p++); + +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + } + +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + + /* compression */ + i = *(p++); +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { + /* not enough data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +index b182998..54ee783 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + int r; + #endif + +- if (session_id + len > limit) { ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { + fatal = 1; + goto err; + } +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return; + data += 2; + +- if (data > (limit - 4)) ++ if (limit - data < 4) + return; + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return; + data += size; + +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) + return; +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + } else { + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) + return; +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + if (data == limit) + goto ri_check; + +- if (data > (limit - 2)) ++ if (limit - data < 2) + goto err; + + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data + len != limit) ++ if (limit - data != len) + goto err; + +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (limit)) ++ if (limit - data < size) + goto err; + # if 0 + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) + return 1; + +- if (data >= limit - 2) ++ if (limit - data <= 2) + return 1; + n2s(data, len); + +- if (data > limit - len) ++ if (limit - data < len) + return 1; + +- while (data <= limit - 4) { ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > limit) ++ if (limit - data < size) + return 1; + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) + return 0; +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); + # endif + +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) + goto ri_check; + + n2s(data, length); +- if (data + length != d + n) { ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + +- if (data + size > (d + n)) ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) + goto ri_check; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ ++ p += i; + } + /* Skip past cipher list */ + n2s(p, i); +- p += i; +- if (p >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ + i = *(p++); +- p += i; +- if (p > limit) ++ if (limit - p < i) + return -1; ++ p += i; ++ + /* Now at start of extensions */ +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) ++ if (limit - p <= 2) + return 0; + n2s(p, i); +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { + unsigned short type, size; + n2s(p, type); + n2s(p, size); +- if (p + size > limit) ++ if (limit - p < size) + return 0; + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + int r; +-- +2.8.4 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37cf2763af --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-2178. + + + +Source: + + + +From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cesar Pereida +Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME + +Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in +order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA +implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for +certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing +attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key. + +CVE-2016-2178 + +Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte +Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell +--- + crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644 +--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c ++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) + goto err; + while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ; +- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { +- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); +- } + + if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, +@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + } + + K = &kq; ++ ++ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else { + K = &k; + } ++ + DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, + dsa->method_mont_p); + if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) +-- +2.8.4 + +From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell +Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME + +The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in +the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the +BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation. + +CVE-2016-2178 + +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz +--- + crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644 +--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c ++++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c +@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + do + if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) + goto err; +- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ; ++ while (BN_is_zero(&k)); ++ ++ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { ++ BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ++ } ++ + + if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, +@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) + goto err; + ++ BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); ++ + /* + * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we + * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This +@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + } + + K = &kq; +- +- BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else { + K = &k; + } +-- +2.8.4 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/tls.scm b/gnu/packages/tls.scm index e543a7e3fe..513edcc1a6 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/tls.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/tls.scm @@ -316,7 +316,9 @@ required structures.") (base32 "06996ds1rk8xhnyb5y273a7xkcxhggp4bq1g02rab55d7bjhfh0x")) (patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch" - "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"))))))) + "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch" + "openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch" + "openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch"))))))) (define-public libressl (package -- cgit v1.2.3