gnu: wpa-supplicant: Add fix for CVE-2015-1863.

* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch: New file.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant): Add patch.

3 files changed, 46 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/gnu-system.am b/gnu-system.am
index 723d25116b..13d06fb920 100644
--- a/gnu-system.am
+++ b/gnu-system.am
@@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   gnu/packages/patches/weex-vacopy.patch			\
   gnu/packages/patches/wicd-urwid-1.3.patch			\
   gnu/packages/patches/wmctrl-64-fix.patch			\
+  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch	\
   gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch	\
   gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch	\
   gnu/packages/patches/xf86-video-geode-glibc-2.20.patch	\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index 3a0361299e..ffaf6b4fc7 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -702,7 +702,9 @@ commands and their arguments.")
                     ".tar.gz"))
               (sha256
                (base32
-                "0skvkl6c10ls4s48b2wmf47h9j1y40nlzxnzn8hyaw2j0prmpapa"))))
+                "0skvkl6c10ls4s48b2wmf47h9j1y40nlzxnzn8hyaw2j0prmpapa"))
+              (patches
+               (list (search-patch "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch")))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
     (arguments
      '(#:phases (alist-replace
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de1964ca76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+index f584fae..a45fe73 100644
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
+ 	if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+ 		os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ 	if (msg.ssid &&
++	    msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+ 	    (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+ 	     os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+ 	     != 0)) {
+-- 
+1.9.1
+