Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into core-updates

1 files changed, 66 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69e65aeb6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864.
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14859
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14862
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14864
+
+Copied from upstream:
+
+https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607
+
+From 8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
+Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 23:08:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14864, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14859
+
+The invalid memory dereference in
+Exiv2::getULong()/Exiv2::StringValueBase::read()/Exiv2::DataValue::read()
+is caused further up the call-stack, by
+v->read(pData, size, byteOrder) in TiffReader::readTiffEntry()
+passing an invalid pData pointer (pData points outside of the Tiff
+file). pData can be set out of bounds in the (size > 4) branch where
+baseOffset() and offset are added to pData_ without checking whether
+the result is still in the file. As offset comes from an untrusted
+source, an attacker can craft an arbitrarily large offset into the
+file.
+
+This commit adds a check into the problematic branch, whether the
+result of the addition would be out of bounds of the Tiff
+file. Furthermore the whole operation is checked for possible
+overflows.
+---
+ src/tiffvisitor.cpp | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
+index 4ab733d4..ef13542e 100644
+--- a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
++++ b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ EXIV2_RCSID("@(#) $Id$")
+ #include <iostream>
+ #include <iomanip>
+ #include <cassert>
++#include <limits>
+ 
+ // *****************************************************************************
+ namespace {
+@@ -1517,7 +1518,19 @@ namespace Exiv2 {
+                 size = 0;
+         }
+         if (size > 4) {
++            // setting pData to pData_ + baseOffset() + offset can result in pData pointing to invalid memory,
++            // as offset can be arbitrarily large
++            if ((static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset))
++             || (static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset() + offset) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(pData_)))
++            {
++                throw Error(59);
++            }
++            if (pData_ + static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) + static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset) > pLast_) {
++                throw Error(58);
++            }
+             pData = const_cast<byte*>(pData_) + baseOffset() + offset;
++
++	    // check for size being invalid
+             if (size > static_cast<uint32_t>(pLast_ - pData)) {
+ #ifndef SUPPRESS_WARNINGS
+                 EXV_ERROR << "Upper boundary of data for "