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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2022-01-19 15:20:26 -0500
committerTobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>2022-01-16 01:00:05 +0100
commitd331bd0a39fd3604581e3c5f15875b7733aad495 (patch)
treef16feda22598fa3260e29d40525cabbf41113559 /gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch
parentab4cdfe7c2a3f6dfca8c6241ffa31e21865344dc (diff)
gnu: wpa-wupplicant: Update to 2.10 [security fixes].
See the upstream advisory for more information on the security fixes contained in these updates: https://w1.fi/security/2022-1/sae-eap-pwd-side-channel-attack-update-2.txt * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal): Update to 2.10. [source]: Remove obsolete patches. * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them. Signed-off-by: Tobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch115
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 115 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c8ba93355..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200
-Subject: ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters
-
-The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
-However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
-addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
-not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
-but did not reject any other unexpected information.
-
-Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
-unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
-potential forging attacks.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/tls/pkcs1.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
- src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-index bbdb0d7..5761dfe 100644
---- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
-@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- os_free(decrypted);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo",
-+ hdr.payload, hdr.length);
-
- pos = hdr.payload;
- end = pos + hdr.length;
-@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- os_free(decrypted);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
-+ hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
-
- if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
-@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
- os_free(decrypted);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters",
-+ next, da_end - next);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
-+ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
-+ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
-+ */
-+ if (da_end > next &&
-+ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
-+ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
-+ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
-+ os_free(decrypted);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-
- if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) {
- char txt[100], txt2[100];
-diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
-index a8944dd..df337ec 100644
---- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
-+++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
-@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- os_free(data);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length);
-
- pos = hdr.payload;
- end = pos + hdr.length;
-@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- os_free(data);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
-+ hdr.payload, hdr.length);
- da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
-
- if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
-@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
- os_free(data);
- return -1;
- }
-+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters",
-+ next, da_end - next);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
-+ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
-+ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
-+ */
-+ if (da_end > next &&
-+ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
-+ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
-+ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
-+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+ "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
-+ os_free(data);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-
- if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) {
- if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) {
---
-cgit v0.12
-