gnu: libcroco: Update to 0.6.13.

* gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/gnome.scm (libcroco): Update to 0.6.13.
[source](patches): Remove.

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 116 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0319c7389f..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-7960:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7960
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394
-
-From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
-Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200
-Subject: input: check end of input before reading a byte
-
-When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
-out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
-could deal to a security bug.
----
- src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c
-index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644
---- a/src/cr-input.c
-+++ b/src/cr-input.c
-@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc)
-                  *we should  free buf here because it's own by CRInput.
-                  *(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf().
-                  */
--                buf = NULL ;
-+                buf = NULL;
-         }
- 
-  cleanup:
-@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this)
- enum CRStatus
- cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
- {
-+        gulong nb_bytes_left = 0;
-+
-         g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this)
-                               && a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR);
- 
-@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
-         if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE)
-                 return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
- 
-+        nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this);
-+
-+        if (nb_bytes_left < 1) {
-+                return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
-+        }
-+
-         *a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index];
- 
-         if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes -
-@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char)
-                 if (*a_char == '\n') {
-                         PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE;
-                 }
--
-         }
- 
-         return status;
--- 
-cgit v0.12
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 675dbe4f08..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-7961:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7961
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7
-
-From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
-Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200
-Subject: tknzr: support only max long rgb values
-
-This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which
-are longer than the support MAXLONG
----
- src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c
-index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644
---- a/src/cr-tknzr.c
-+++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c
-@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
-         status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
-         ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
- 
-+        if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
-+                status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
-+                goto error;
-+        }
-+
-         red = num->val;
-         cr_num_destroy (num);
-         num = NULL;
-@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
-                 status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
-                 ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
- 
-+                if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
-+                        status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
-+                        goto error;
-+                }
-+
-                 PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);
-                 if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {
-                         SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);
--- 
-cgit v0.12
-