gnu: exiv2: Add upstream security fixes.

Fixes CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14860, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864.

* gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them.
* gnu/packages/image.scm (exiv2)[source]: Use them.

4 files changed, 118 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 2aa2f7b20c..90dc7aec1b 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -605,6 +605,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/eudev-rules-directory.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/evilwm-lost-focus-bug.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/exim-CVE-2017-1000369.patch		\
+  %D%/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch		\
+  %D%/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/fastcap-mulGlobal.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/fastcap-mulSetup.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/fasthenry-spAllocate.patch		\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/image.scm b/gnu/packages/image.scm
index b53247de82..df8ac67e41 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/image.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/image.scm
@@ -866,6 +866,8 @@ channels.")
                                        version ".tar.gz")
                         (string-append "https://fossies.org/linux/misc/exiv2-"
                                        version ".tar.gz")))
+             (patches (search-patches "exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch"
+                                      "exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch"))
              (sha256
               (base32
                "1yza317qxd8yshvqnay164imm0ks7cvij8y8j86p1gqi1153qpn7"))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69e65aeb6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14859-14862-14864.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-14859, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14864.
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14859
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14862
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14864
+
+Copied from upstream:
+
+https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607
+
+From 8a586c74bbe3fbca64e86e42a42282c73f427607 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
+Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 23:08:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14864, CVE-2017-14862 and CVE-2017-14859
+
+The invalid memory dereference in
+Exiv2::getULong()/Exiv2::StringValueBase::read()/Exiv2::DataValue::read()
+is caused further up the call-stack, by
+v->read(pData, size, byteOrder) in TiffReader::readTiffEntry()
+passing an invalid pData pointer (pData points outside of the Tiff
+file). pData can be set out of bounds in the (size > 4) branch where
+baseOffset() and offset are added to pData_ without checking whether
+the result is still in the file. As offset comes from an untrusted
+source, an attacker can craft an arbitrarily large offset into the
+file.
+
+This commit adds a check into the problematic branch, whether the
+result of the addition would be out of bounds of the Tiff
+file. Furthermore the whole operation is checked for possible
+overflows.
+---
+ src/tiffvisitor.cpp | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
+index 4ab733d4..ef13542e 100644
+--- a/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
++++ b/src/tiffvisitor.cpp
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ EXIV2_RCSID("@(#) $Id$")
+ #include <iostream>
+ #include <iomanip>
+ #include <cassert>
++#include <limits>
+ 
+ // *****************************************************************************
+ namespace {
+@@ -1517,7 +1518,19 @@ namespace Exiv2 {
+                 size = 0;
+         }
+         if (size > 4) {
++            // setting pData to pData_ + baseOffset() + offset can result in pData pointing to invalid memory,
++            // as offset can be arbitrarily large
++            if ((static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset))
++             || (static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset() + offset) > std::numeric_limits<uintptr_t>::max() - reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(pData_)))
++            {
++                throw Error(59);
++            }
++            if (pData_ + static_cast<uintptr_t>(baseOffset()) + static_cast<uintptr_t>(offset) > pLast_) {
++                throw Error(58);
++            }
+             pData = const_cast<byte*>(pData_) + baseOffset() + offset;
++
++	    // check for size being invalid
+             if (size > static_cast<uint32_t>(pLast_ - pData)) {
+ #ifndef SUPPRESS_WARNINGS
+                 EXV_ERROR << "Upper boundary of data for "
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..43e6076b71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/exiv2-CVE-2017-14860.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-14860.
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14860
+https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14860
+
+Copied from upstream:
+
+https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2/commit/ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce
+
+From ff18fec24b119579df26fd2ebb8bb012cde102ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20=C4=8Cerm=C3=A1k?= <dan.cermak@cgc-instruments.com>
+Date: Fri, 6 Oct 2017 23:09:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix for CVE-2017-14860
+
+A heap buffer overflow could occur in memcpy when icc.size_ is larger
+than data.size_ - pad, as then memcpy would read out of bounds of data.
+
+This commit adds a sanity check to iccLength (= icc.size_): if it is
+larger than data.size_ - pad (i.e. an overflow would be caused) an
+exception is thrown.
+
+This fixes #71.
+---
+ src/jp2image.cpp | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jp2image.cpp b/src/jp2image.cpp
+index 747145cf..748d39b5 100644
+--- a/src/jp2image.cpp
++++ b/src/jp2image.cpp
+@@ -269,10 +269,15 @@ namespace Exiv2
+                             std::cout << "Exiv2::Jp2Image::readMetadata: "
+                                      << "Color data found" << std::endl;
+ #endif
+-                            long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
++                            const long pad = 3 ; // 3 padding bytes 2 0 0
+                             DataBuf data(subBox.length+8);
+                             io_->read(data.pData_,data.size_);
+-                            long    iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
++                            const long    iccLength = getULong(data.pData_+pad, bigEndian);
++                            // subtracting pad from data.size_ is safe:
++                            // size_ is at least 8 and pad = 3
++                            if (iccLength > data.size_ - pad) {
++                                throw Error(58);
++			    }
+                             DataBuf icc(iccLength);
+                             ::memcpy(icc.pData_,data.pData_+pad,icc.size_);
+ #ifdef DEBUG