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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch66
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch50
2 files changed, 116 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0319c7389f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7960.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-7960:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7960
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394
+
+From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
+Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200
+Subject: input: check end of input before reading a byte
+
+When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
+out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
+could deal to a security bug.
+---
+ src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c
+index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644
+--- a/src/cr-input.c
++++ b/src/cr-input.c
+@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc)
+ *we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput.
+ *(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf().
+ */
+- buf = NULL ;
++ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ cleanup:
+@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this)
+ enum CRStatus
+ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
+ {
++ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0;
++
+ g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this)
+ && a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR);
+
+@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
+ if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE)
+ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
+
++ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this);
++
++ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) {
++ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
++ }
++
+ *a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index];
+
+ if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes -
+@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char)
+ if (*a_char == '\n') {
+ PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE;
+ }
+-
+ }
+
+ return status;
+--
+cgit v0.12
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..675dbe4f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libcroco-CVE-2017-7961.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-7961:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7961
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://git.gnome.org/browse/libcroco/commit/?id=9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7
+
+From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
+Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200
+Subject: tknzr: support only max long rgb values
+
+This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which
+are longer than the support MAXLONG
+---
+ src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c
+index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644
+--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c
++++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c
+@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
+ status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
+ ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+
++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ red = num->val;
+ cr_num_destroy (num);
+ num = NULL;
+@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
+ status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
+ ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+
++ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
++ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
++ goto error;
++ }
++
+ PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);
+ if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {
+ SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);
+--
+cgit v0.12
+