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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch40
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch16
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch108
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch94
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch18
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch38
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/zip.scm7
7 files changed, 275 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
index a38c3da51c..03c1e3c068 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch
@@ -1,40 +1,28 @@
-Copied from Debian.
+Copied from Fedora.
-From: mancha <mancha1 AT zoho DOT com>
-Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2014
-Subject: Info-ZIP UnZip buffer overflow
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/776589
-
-By carefully crafting a corrupt ZIP archive with "extra fields" that
-purport to have compressed blocks larger than the corresponding
-uncompressed blocks in STORED no-compression mode, an attacker can
-trigger a heap overflow that can result in application crash or
-possibly have other unspecified impact.
-
-This patch ensures that when extra fields use STORED mode, the
-"compressed" and uncompressed block sizes match.
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index a0a4929..9ef80b3 100644
--- a/extract.c
+++ b/extract.c
-@@ -2228,6 +2228,7 @@
+@@ -2214,6 +2214,7 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
ulg eb_ucsize;
uch *eb_ucptr;
int r;
-+ ush eb_compr_method;
++ ush method;
if (compr_offset < 4) /* field is not compressed: */
return PK_OK; /* do nothing and signal OK */
-@@ -2244,6 +2245,14 @@
- ((eb_ucsize > 0L) && (eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN))))
- return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no/bad compressed data! */
+@@ -2223,6 +2224,12 @@ static int test_compr_eb(__G__ eb, eb_size, compr_offset, test_uc_ebdata)
+ eb_size <= (compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN)))
+ return IZ_EF_TRUNC; /* no compressed data! */
-+ /* 2014-11-03 Michal Zalewski, SMS.
-+ * For STORE method, compressed and uncompressed sizes must agree.
-+ * http://www.info-zip.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=450
-+ */
-+ eb_compr_method = makeword( eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
-+ if ((eb_compr_method == STORED) && (eb_size - compr_offset != eb_ucsize))
-+ return PK_ERR;
++ method = makeword(eb + (EB_HEADSIZE + compr_offset));
++ if ((method == STORED) && (eb_size != compr_offset + EB_CMPRHEADLEN + eb_ucsize))
++ return PK_ERR; /* compressed & uncompressed
++ * should match in STORED
++ * method */
+
if (
#ifdef INT_16BIT
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a24c31bb10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-attribs-overflow.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff -up unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow unzip60/zipinfo.c
+--- unzip60/zipinfo.c.attribs-overflow 2009-11-30 09:55:39.000000000 +0100
++++ unzip60/zipinfo.c 2009-11-30 09:56:42.844263244 +0100
+@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ static int zi_short(__G) /* return PK-
+ #endif
+ int k, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+ unsigned hostnum, hostver, methid, methnum, xattr;
+- char *p, workspace[12], attribs[16];
++ char *p, workspace[12], attribs[17];
+ char methbuf[5];
+ static ZCONST char dtype[5]="NXFS"; /* normal, maximum, fast, superfast */
+ static ZCONST char Far os[NUM_HOSTS+1][4] = {
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..33498db95e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
+---
+ crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
+index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
+--- a/crypt.c
++++ b/crypt.c
+@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
+ GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
+ defer_leftover_input(__G);
+ for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
+- b = NEXTBYTE;
++ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
++ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
++ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
++ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
++ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
++ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
++ */
++ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
++ {
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ h[n] = (uch)b;
+ Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
+ }
+--
+2.4.6
+
+
+From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
+
+Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
+---
+ extract.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
+ int repeated_buf_err;
+ bz_stream bstrm;
+
++ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
++ /* avoid an infinite loop */
++ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
++ return 2;
++ }
++
+ #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
+ if (G.redirect_slide)
+ wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
+--
+2.4.6
+
+
+From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
+
+Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
+---
+ extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+ if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
+ zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
+
+- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
++ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
++ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
++ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
++ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
++ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ csiz_decrypted -= 12;
++ }
+ if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
+--
+2.5.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a5f274b86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-format-secure.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index eeb2f57..a0a4929 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ */
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j + blknum*DIR_BLKSIZ + 1));
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+- LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401,
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ error_in_archive = PK_BADERR;
+ }
+ reached_end = TRUE; /* ...so no more left to do */
+@@ -752,8 +752,8 @@ int extract_or_test_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+
+ #ifndef SFX
+ if (no_endsig_found) { /* just to make sure */
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ if (!error_in_archive) /* don't overwrite stronger error */
+ error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
+ }
+diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
+index 15e0011..f7359c3 100644
+--- a/list.c
++++ b/list.c
+@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
+ && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
+ ) { /* just to make sure again */
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401,
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */
+ }
+
+@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ return PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
+ }
+ }
+@@ -674,7 +675,7 @@ int get_time_stamp(__G__ last_modtime, nmember) /* return PK-type error code */
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
+
+ if (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4)) { /* just to make sure again */
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ error_in_archive = PK_WARN;
+ }
+ if (*nmember == 0L && error_in_archive <= PK_WARN)
+diff --git a/zipinfo.c b/zipinfo.c
+index 6e22cc8..ac5c61b 100644
+--- a/zipinfo.c
++++ b/zipinfo.c
+@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+ ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(CentSigMsg), j));
+ Info(slide, 0x401,
+- ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(ReportMsg)));
+ error_in_archive = PK_BADERR; /* sig not found */
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -960,7 +960,8 @@ int zipinfo(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ && (!G.ecrec.is_zip64_archive)
+ && (memcmp(G.sig, end_central_sig, 4) != 0)
+ ) { /* just to make sure again */
+- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide, LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
++ Info(slide, 0x401,
++ ((char *)slide,"%s", LoadFarString(EndSigMsg)));
+ error_in_archive = PK_WARN; /* didn't find sig */
+ }
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3417ad873d..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-Copied from Debian.
-
-From: sms
-Subject: Increase size of cfactorstr array to avoid buffer overflow
-Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/741384
-X-Debian-version: 6.0-11
-
---- a/list.c
-+++ b/list.c
-@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
- {
- int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
- #ifndef WINDLL
-- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
-+ char sgn, cfactorstr[12];
- int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
- #endif
- int date_format;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76963480d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Copied from Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/plain/unzip-6.0-overflow-long-fsize.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+diff --git a/list.c b/list.c
+index f7359c3..4c3d703 100644
+--- a/list.c
++++ b/list.c
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ {
+ int do_this_file=FALSE, cfactor, error, error_in_archive=PK_COOL;
+ #ifndef WINDLL
+- char sgn, cfactorstr[10];
++ char sgn, cfactorstr[13];
+ int longhdr=(uO.vflag>1);
+ #endif
+ int date_format;
+@@ -339,7 +339,19 @@ int list_files(__G) /* return PK-type error code */
+ G.crec.compression_method == ENHDEFLATED) {
+ methbuf[5] = dtype[(G.crec.general_purpose_bit_flag>>1) & 3];
+ } else if (methnum >= NUM_METHODS) {
+- sprintf(&methbuf[4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++ /* 2013-02-26 SMS.
++ * http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail
++ * &aid=2861648&group_id=118012&atid=679786
++ * Unexpectedly large compression methods overflow
++ * &methbuf[]. Use the old, three-digit decimal format
++ * for values which fit. Otherwise, sacrifice the
++ * colon, and use four-digit hexadecimal.
++ */
++ if (G.crec.compression_method <= 999) {
++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 4], "%03u", G.crec.compression_method);
++ } else {
++ sprintf( &methbuf[ 3], "%04X", G.crec.compression_method);
++ }
+ }
+
+ #if 0 /* GRR/Euro: add this? */
diff --git a/gnu/packages/zip.scm b/gnu/packages/zip.scm
index f0f27ddfe2..83c452778c 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/zip.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/zip.scm
@@ -86,9 +86,12 @@ Compression ratios of 2:1 to 3:1 are common for text files.")
"unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch"
"unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch"
"unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch"
- "unzip-increase-size-of-cfactorstr.patch"
"unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch"
- "unzip-remove-build-date.patch")))))
+ "unzip-remove-build-date.patch"
+ "unzip-attribs-overflow.patch"
+ "unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch"
+ "unzip-format-secure.patch"
+ "unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
;; no inputs; bzip2 is not supported, since not compiled with BZ_NO_STDIO
(arguments
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.2) at 2024-11-10 15:06:02 +0000